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GIVING STATE TAX INCENTIVES TO 
CORPORATIONS: 








The South has traditionally attracted multinational automakers 
for many reasons; the South boasts notoriously low labor costs, cheap 
land, skilled industrial workers, and auto parts manufacturers between 
Atlanta and Virginia along Interstate 85.
1
  Today, however, 
multinational corporations have a new reason to look to the South as a 
prime location incentive packages.  “Typically, jurisdictions offer 
incentive packages that include income and sales-tax reductions, 
employment-based tax credits, land preparation, worker-training 
subsidies, and relaxation of existing environmental and zoning laws.”
2
 
South Carolina uses targeted tax incentives in an attempt to 
stimulate the economy and create jobs within the state.   
Targeted tax incentives . . . are fiscal tools 
designed to attract a private firm to a new location, 
help support or expand an existing business, or to 
prevent a company from relocating to another city or 
state. . . .  While these policies are common among 
state governments, the efficacy of these policies has 
been called into question over and over again by 
many scholars and policy makers.
3
 
                                                 
* Class of 2011, University of South Carolina School of Law.  B.A., 
Furman University.  The author would like to thank the members of SCJILB 
for their editing efforts and the improvement of this note. 
1 OUTLOOK ’96: THE ECONOMY; BMW Follows a Trend to the 
Southeast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at C12, available at 1996 WLNR 
4357471; see also James Bennet, Company News; Mercedes Selects Alabama 
Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at D1, available at 1993 WLNR 3344209 
(listing reasons auto makers build plants in the South). 
2 Gary Biglaiser & Claudio Mezzetti, Incentive Auctions and Information 
Revelation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 145, 145 (2000). 
3 PETER T. CALCAGNO & FRANK HEFNER, UNLEASHING CAPITALISM:  A 
PRESCRIPTION fOR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 131 (S.C. 
Policy Council Educ. Found., 2009). 
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This article will begin by giving an overview of the recent 
history of the use of tax incentives in the South to lure corporations.  
More specifically, this article will examine BMW’s and Boeing’s 
choice to set up shop in South Carolina and Mercedes-Benz’s choice to 
build in Alabama.  Next, this article will scrutinize the economic 
impact that state tax incentives have on the states themselves by 
looking at typical arguments that economic proponents use.  Using 
BMW as a case study, this article will analyze the employment and 
income opportunities BMW has offered the community.  Furthermore, 
this article will investigate BMW’s training programs, research skill 
tutorials, and advanced facility to determine how the company itself has 
worked to boost the state’s economy.  In examining the opponents’ 
arguments against state tax incentives, this article offers economists’ 
arguments, which assert that bringing corporations into a state that does 
not have the knowledge base, skills, or tools necessary to compete is 
essentially a state buying jobs for its citizens. 
In addition, this article will examine the governmental impact 
that state tax incentives have on state government.  Recently, Boeing 
has, in effect, collapsed South Carolina’s state government and limited 
transparency by securing one of the biggest economic deals to ever 
come to the state by way of a top-secret transaction.  This article also 
provides an opportunity-cost analysis, as well as a section balancing 
whether positive externalities can outweigh a state’s expenditure of 
scarce tax dollars.  Then, this article will examine a recently passed 
piece of legislation, the South Carolina Economic Development 
Competitiveness Act of 2010, and its possible positive and negative 
effects on the state.  Finally, this article will conclude with an argument 
that opponents of state tax incentives lean on when their backs are 
against the wall: the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
I.  RECENT HISTORY OF THE USE OF TAX INCENTIVES TO LURE 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO THE SOUTH 
 
A.  BMW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
The BMW Manufacturing Company chose South Carolina as the 
site for its $625 million automobile-assembly plant in 1992.  South 
Carolina offered BMW an incentive package worth $150 million in 
exchange for the 2,000 jobs BMW predicted it would create.
4
  The 
                                                 
4 John J. Garman, The New War Between the States:  A Look at the 
Incentives to Recruit Foreign Automakers to the South, Daimlerchrysler Corp. 
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incentives that South Carolina offered included an employment training 
program, “where South Carolina provided ‘all hand tools, manuals and 
classroom facilities’ and hired instructors required for training.  
Additionally, South Carolina agreed to manage the recruiting, 
screening, and testing of potential plant employees.”
5
  Finally, South 
Carolina invested an additional $40 million to modernize and extend 
the runway at a nearby airport.
6
 
Spartanburg, South Carolina attracted BMW with “promises of 
an eager, technically trained work force, the proximity of both the port 
of Charleston and numerous automotive suppliers, tax incentives, and a 
favorable climate.”
7
  The anti-trade-union climate in South Carolina 
also added to the state’s attractiveness because “BMW wish[ed] to 
avoid a bruising fight against organized labor.”
8
 
BMW now employs 5,000 people at its Spartanburg, South 
Carolina plant and “estimates its investments through June [2008] at 




B.  MERCEDES-BENZ IN ALABAMA 
 
Mercedes-Benz chose Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, as the site 
of its first automobile assembly plant in 1993.  In April of that year, 
Mercedes-Benz announced that it intended to open the assembly plant, 
which would provide Alabama with 1,500 jobs.  The prospect of the 
new plant had launched a five-month bidding war between almost 
                                                                                                 
v. Cuno, and the European Union’s Prohibition Against State Aid, 24 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 313, 333 (2007) (citing Krystal Miller, BMW to Build Factory 
in U.S., Employ 2,000:  Firm’s First Plant Outside Germany to Make Cars in 
South Carolina in 1995, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A2). 
5 Garman, supra note 4, at 333 (quoting Robert M. Ady, Why BMW 
Cruised into Spartanburg, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1992, at A). 
6 Id. 
7 Doron P. Levin, What BMW Sees In South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
11, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 3417888. 
8 Id.; see also Aviation and the South: Advantage Dixie, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
9, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 428479 (citing “anti-trade-union climate” as 
a common attraction for corporations in southern states). 
9 Bruce Smith, S.C. Governor Signs Incentive Package for Boeing, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 30, 2009, 7:57 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2009-10-30-boeing-
sc_N.htm. 
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  Alabama eventually wooed the automaker, and 
Mercedes-Benz planned to “produce 60,000 vehicles at the [Alabama] 




Mercedes-Benz chose Alabama not only for the attractiveness of 
the region in the vicinity of many auto manufacturers, but also for 
Tuscaloosa’s advanced transportation infrastructure.
12
  Mercedes-Benz 
planned to import many auto parts and to export two-thirds of the 
plant’s production.  An interstate highway and a railroad line run by the 




C.  BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
After automakers, the aircraft industry also became attracted to 
the South’s anti-union climate.  Boeing had operated its first assembly 
line in Everett, Washington.  “Machinists there went on a 57-day 
walkout in 2008 that cost the company more than $2 billion and led 
some airlines to switch their orders to Europe’s Airbus.”
14
  In 2009, 
Boeing, decided to break ties with the fractious labor union in 
Washington, announced that it would build a $750 million factory in 
North Charleston, South Carolina.
15
  To further its goals of “flexibility 
and . . . stability in their supply chain,” Boeing will replicate the 
manufacturing of all plane parts produced in Washington, allowing the 
South Carolina plant to operate independently from Washington.
16
  
In addition to having “one of the lowest rates of unionization in 
the country,” South Carolina has much to offer in North Charleston—
proximity to an international airport and port facilities.  Despite 
Boeing’s doubts about South Carolina’s work force and history of 
political friction, Boeing chose South Carolina as the location for its 
new assembly line.
17
   
                                                 
10 Bennet, supra note 1; see also James Bennet, Company News; Mercedes 
to Announce Site for U.S. Plant Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at D3, 
available at 1993 WLNR 3434150. 
11 Bennet, supra note 1, at D1. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Aviation, supra note 8. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Andy Shain, S.C. Traveled a Long Road to Land Boeing, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Nov. 1, 2009, at B1. 
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The economic impact of Boeing’s new plant in North Charleston 
is welcome in a state with an 11.6% unemployment rate, the sixth 
highest in the nation.
18
  South Carolina offered Boeing an incentive 
package worth more than $450 million.  Boeing is estimated to employ 
3,800 workers by 2015.  Boeing initially invested $750 million, and 
Boeing and its suppliers are expected to invest $10 billion directly and 




D.  OTHER WAYS STATES USE TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Some states have been creative in their use of state tax 
incentives.  For example, thirty-eight “states have passed incentive 
packages to bolster economic development associated with the 
entertainment industries or quell ‘runway productions’—projects 
intended to appear on screen as certain geographical areas but shot 
elsewhere.”
20
  So, states like Louisiana and New Mexico offer 
incentives to film companies wanting to produce a movie in Texas, and 
those film companies settle for scenery that looks like Texas because it 
comes with an enticing incentives package.
21
  South Carolina also 
offers generous film incentives in the form of an employee wage 
rebate, South Carolina supplier rebate, sales tax exemption, no location 
fee for using State properties, and a Motion Picture Tax Credit.  These 
incentives are subject to approval by the South Carolina Film 
Commission and only require a $500 application fee.
22
  Other states, 
especially in the past ten years, have been offering incentives to 
companies who help promote state objectives.  For example, some 
states give incentives to companies that reduce their carbon dioxide 
emissions or create renewable energy.
23
 
                                                 
18 Levin, supra note 7. 
19 Shain, supra note 17, at B1. 
20 Deena Kalai, Feature: Now Showing!: Entertainment & Sports Law: 
Does a Little Go a Long Way?: Texas Entertainment Industry Economic 
Incentives, 71 TEX. B.J. 734, 735 (2008). 
21 Id. 
22 Production Incentives, S.C. FILM COMM’N, 
http://www.filmsc.com/incentives/test123/default.aspx (last visited May 28, 
2011). 




(giving options for companies in the state of Washington to receive tax 
incentives for using or manufacturing certain levels of renewable energy);  see 
262 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
 
II.  ECONOMIC IMPACT: PROS AND CONS OF STATE TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Competition among states to lure companies through tax 
incentives provides no net gain to the United States economy.  Each 
state may appear better off competing for particular businesses with its 
neighbor, but auctions for business leave the nation’s economy “with 
less of both private and public goods than if such competition was 
prohibited.”
24
  Using BMW’s eighteen years in Spartanburg, South 
Carolina as an example, this section will examine the economic impact 
a multinational corporation has had on a state that gave the corporation 
a tax incentives package as a condition of locating there.
25
   
 
A.  PROS: CAPITAL, INCOME AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STATE TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Proponents of state tax incentive programs argue that they 
“reduce[] the inherently inefficient taxation of capital.”
26
  While a 
reduction of tax revenues does result when a state gives tax incentives, 
the loss of state tax revenue is not necessarily bad for the economy at 
large.  When money remains in private hands, instead of being paid to 
the state, investment and incomes increase because “consumers and 
                                                                                                 
also California Incentives and Laws for EVs, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Feb. 19, 
2010, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/progs/ind_state_laws.php/CA/ELEC. 
24 CALCAGNO & HEFNER, supra note 3, at 133 (quoting M.L. BURSTEIN & 
A.J. ROLNICK, CONGRESS SHOULD END THE ECONOMIC WAR AMONG THE 
STATES, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1994 Annual Report 9(1): 3-19 
(1995)). 
25 South Carolina’s BMW plant is a part of the BMW Group, who’s 
Production Network spans twenty-three plants and twelve countries.  The 
Spartanburg plant, the only BMW plant in the United States, produces the 
BMW X5 and X6 models, and the plant began production of the X3 in 2010 for 
the global market.  See Douglas P. Woodward & Paulo Guimarães, BMW in 




26 Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives 
in the United States and the European Union, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 93, 113 
(2008) (citing James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: 
Much Ado About Nothing?, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 101, 110 (2006)). 
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However, another proponent of tax competition argues in favor 
of discriminatory tax regimes.  Michael Keen, a professor of 
Economics at the University of Essex, UK, reasons that these “tax 
regimes are socially desirable because they protect tax revenues.”
28
  
Keen bases his argument on a model where tax competition is confined 
to a mobile sector, while an immobile sector maintains or increases 
high levels of taxation.  A country using a discriminatory tax regime 
“can protect its ability to collect a great deal of tax revenue from an 
immobile base while at the same time competing with foreign 
countries, through preferential taxation, for the other’s mobile base and 
the marginal revenue increase it represents.”
29
 
In addition, tax competition promotes efficient allocation of 
resources.
30
  Incentives create ideal matches between businesses and 
localities whenever a locality understands its needs better than a 
company.  This understanding allows bidding to solve the “problem of 
asymmetric distribution [of information] because the same firm 
assumes different values in different jurisdictions and that additional 
value is reflected in the bid.”
31
 
If competition between states was restricted or restrained, 
economic welfare may suffer
32
 because in the absence of competition, 
companies have “less incentive to be responsive to the desires of 
consumers and less pressure to minimize costs.”
33
  Tax revenue 
reductions that result when states give away tax incentives force state 




                                                 
27 Kaye, supra note 26, at 113 (citing James R. Rogers, State Tax 
Competition and Congressional Commerce Power:  The Original Purchase of 
Concurrent Taxing Authority, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 120 (1996)).  
28 Kaye, supra note 26, at 113-14 (citing Michael Keen, Preferential 
Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L. TAX J. 757, 758 
(2001)). 
29 Id. 
30  Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 26, at 108, 120. 
31 Kaye, supra note 26, at 114 (citing Clayton P. Gillette, Business 
Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 447, 453-58 (1997-1998). 
32 Charles E. McLure, Tax Competition:  Is What’s Good for the Private 
Goose Also Good for the Public Gander?, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 341, 344 (1986). 
33 Id. 
34 Kaye, supra note 26, at 114; see also Rogers, supra note 26, at 109. 
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2.  BMW’S PROVISION OF EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME FOR 
SOUTH CAROLINA RESIDENTS, BOTH DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY 
 
Raising income and creating jobs in South Carolina is an 
important goal for policymakers and economic development advocates.  
The State has a very low per capita income, and this trend is not new; 
South Carolina has lagged behind the national average for decades.  
Thus, attracting new investment, raising income, and creating jobs 
remain the fundamental missions as policymakers attempt to increase 
the standard of living in South Carolina.
35
  After the state’s investment 
in BMW, the Upstate of South Carolina went through a drastic 
economic shift from a textile-manufacturing region into an automotive-
production region, which “has created a stronger automotive cluster 
and a more diversified economy.”
36
   
BMW has contributed to South Carolina’s economy through 
large-scale investment.  Unique from other investments, “automotive 
plants have outsized employment and income effects.  This is because 
they are final product producers (rather than intermediate producers in 
a value chain) linked to a long sequence of economic activity.”
37
  
BMW’s cumulative investment reached more than $5 billion by the end 
of 2007.
38
  The continual flow of capital into the BMW plant allows 
South Carolina to remain a leader in “attracting inward foreign direct 
investment.”  This investment capital raises living standards for the 
community by providing more employment opportunities.
39
 
The 2008 Moore School of Business study explains how BMW’s 
business in Spartanburg County has spread economic benefits through 
the multiplier effect, “an accepted and widely practiced technique used 
to assess the total impact of investment and payroll.”
40
  Using an inter-
industry model as a basis for calculating economic impacts, the study 
calculated the “extent to which direct activities at the BMW plant 
stimulate further economic effects, spreading employment and income . 
. . .”
41
  First, economists assessed the initial effects of local payroll and 
purchases at the automobile plant.  They then examined indirect and 
                                                 
35 Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 6. 
36 Id. at 4. 
37 Id. at 5. 
38 Id. at 1. 
39 Id. at 6. 
40 Id. at 7. 
41 Id.  
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induced effects that stem from the immediate effects of the local 
payroll and purchases. 
The study found that BMW has an especially large multiplier 
effect for two main reasons:  (1) BMW’s “extensive regional supplier 
network and (2) its relatively large direct payroll, which is largely spent 
at local businesses.”
42
  The regional supplier network is made up of 
companies throughout North America from which BMW purchases 
supplies, materials, and services; as a result, this network indirectly 
creates more jobs and income.  The suppliers with income from BMW 
then re-spend that income, creating “additional indirect employment 
and earnings as their purchases spread into the wider economy.”
43
  
Indirect effects are measured by employment; “[i]n this case, 1.87 jobs 




The second main reason for BMW’s large multiplier effect is 
called “the induced effect,” which stems from spending related to the 
direct payroll.  BMW’s $437 million of direct personal income paid to 
their employees is subsequently spent at local businesses and on 
various services, which leads to “further rounds of spending and 
income.”
45
  The study found that the induced effect of BMW’s payroll 
amounts to an employment of 7,526 workers, which is “significant for a 
single plant.”
46
  The study found that BMW’s South Carolina 
investment, through the multiplier effect, supports 23,050 jobs in the 
state.  While a typical employment multiplier for industries and 




An input-output analysis generated by the same study indicated 
the total output of BMW’s annual economic activities in 2007 to be 
more than $8.8 billion.  The plant accounts for $6.3 billion in annual 
output, while the remainder consisted of output “through indirect and 
induced linkages with the economy at large.”
48
 
While the present study concentrated mainly on BMW’s 
economic impacts, the fiscal effects of employees paying property, 
income, and sales taxes also benefit the community.  A 2002 Moore 
                                                 
42 Id. at 8. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 9. 
48 Id. at 11. 
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School of Business study found that the four South Carolina counties 
most affected by BMW’s presence—Anderson, Greenville, Laurens, 
and Spartanburg—received $2.4 million each year in additional net 
revenue.
49
   
3.  BMW’S INFLUENCE ON THE COMMUNITY 
 
South Carolina, along with many regions worldwide, faces 
economic and social development challenges.  BMW has invested in 
the state via its long-run sustainability goal; not only is a healthy 
economy important, but the state must also maintain the natural 
environment and social needs of the corporation through health and 
education goals.   BMW serves as an example of how other businesses 
can and should sacrifice some of their solely profit-driven motive and 
work for the prosperity of the state and its citizens.
50
 




  This 
environmental certification is only given to facilities that meet or 
exceed international environmental standards.
53
  To qualify for an ISO 
14001, the organization must meet standards of an Environmental 
Management System (EMS) by way of “a policy statement which 
includes commitments to prevention of pollution, continual 
improvement of the EMS leading to improvements in overall 
environmental performance, and compliance with all applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements.”
54
  The international 
environmental field attempts to establish systematic environmental 
sustainability through this standard.
55
  In addition, BMW recommends 
that its regional suppliers follow its example and institute forward-
                                                 
49 Id. at 15. 
50 Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 10. 
51  The International Organization for Standardization 14001 requires an 
organization to “put in place and implement a series of practices and 
procedures that, when taken together, result in an environmental management 
system.”  This is a voluntary, international standard for companies to strive 
toward.  Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 – Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter EPA ISO 14001 FAQs] 
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/wastewater/Environmental-Management-System-
ISO-14001-Frequently-Asked-Questions.cfm (last updated Apr. 23, 2010). 
52 Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 13. 
53 Id  
54 EPA ISO 14001 FAQs, supra note 52. 
55 Woodward & Guimarães, supra note 25, at 13.  
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  Many of the suppliers have 
followed suit.
57
   
Moreover, due to a progressive recycling program, the Landfill 
Gas-to-Energy Project, and a heavy reliance on methane gas, BMW has 
become a leader in the use of alternative energy.
58
  In using methane, 
BMW decreases the need for use of fossil fuels and greatly reduces the 
total amount of carbon dioxide emissions.
59
  BMW’s paint shop is also 
environmentally cautious; energy generated by methane gas powers the 
shop, and water-based paint is used instead of higher-solvent paints 
with toxins.
60
  Companies like BMW, who are invested in and informed 
about environmental sustainability, are pioneers in the field and bring 
the best environmental practices to a state where a widespread positive 
environmental attitude is lacking. 
In addition to its environmental impact, large companies like 
BMW support and fiscally impact the community via revenue 
contributions “through employee property, income, and sales taxes.”
61
  
In addition to providing revenue, generating community development is 
important for a company.
62
  Furthermore, national chains of restaurants 
and motels, as well as retail stores and banks, bought land in the 
surrounding counties to accommodate BMW’s new employees.  This 
new interest in Spartanburg-area land sent property values soaring; 
experts estimated that land values increased by 25% in the year after 
BMW announced its plans to build a plant in the Upstate.
63
 
South Carolina is currently host to the Information Technology 
Research Center located on Clemson University’s campus in the 
International Center for Automotive Research.
64
  The center focuses on 
maintenance-system automation, telematics, and onboard computing; 
consequently, BMW’s investment is helping South Carolina’s effort “to 
build a knowledge-based economy.”
65
  BMW also donates to local 
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 15.  
62 Id.  
63 Lyn Riddle, Real Estate; The BMW Plant Under Construction in South 
Carolina is Pushing up Property Values Nearby, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at 
D20, available at 1993 WLNR 3401201. 
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
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B.  CONS: BUYING JOBS CAN BE EXPENSIVE 
 
1.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Legal scholars have analyzed the harmful effects of incentive 
packages given by state and local governments.  Opponents of state-tax 
competition argue that tax incentives do not actually influence location 
decisions of businesses.
67
  Incentives are only one factor among many 
that businesses consider when deciding where to locate.
68
  Peter D. 
Enrich, professor of State and Local Taxation and State and Local 
Government at Northeastern University School of Law, asserts that 
“tax incentives . . . [,] even when they create significant differentials in 
tax levels, simply are not large enough to exert substantial influence on 
business location decisions.”
69
  The state and local taxes that businesses 
must pay generally account for less than 2% of their total cost of 
operating in the United States; therefore, a reduction of such costs do 
not provide great leverage over their decisions to choose locations.
70
 
Since incentives have little weight in corporate decision-making, 
and business investment would have happened anyway, it follows that 
state tax incentives cause the “winning” state to lose substantial 
revenue.
71
  “The majority of the creators of job and productivity gains 
throughout a state’s economy are hurt as their taxes go up to pay for 




Tax incentive competition merely transports economic activity 
from state to state, achieving zero-sum net gain on both the national 
and local levels.
73
  Any increase of jobs and investment in one state is 
                                                 
66 Id. at 16.  
67 Kaye, supra note 26, at 114.  
68 Id.  
69 Kaye, supra note 26, at 115 (quoting Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States 
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for 
Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 337, 397 (1996)). 
70 Kaye, supra note 26, at 115. 
71 See Enrich, supra note 70, at 405. 
72 Kaye, supra note 26, at 115 (quoting John Hood, Ante Freeze: Stop the 
State Bidding Wars for Big Business, 68 POL’Y REV. 62, 62 (1994)). 
73 Kaye, supra note 26, at 115. 
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offset by an equal loss through incentive wars by another state.
74
  In 
fact, competitive efforts of states are likely to cancel out any benefits 
that states that offer tax incentives may reap, which “can be a negative-
sum game that produces a net loss.”
75
 
The models that proponents of tax incentive packages use to 
demonstrate benefits of preferential tax regimes are based on extreme 
assumptions that a government’s main goal would be revenue 
maximization.
76
  These assumptions “make the oversimplified model’s 
practical relevance and applicability tenuous at best.”
77
  Such a model 
fails to account for governmental interests other than revenue 
maximization.
78
  Additionally, the models may be flawed. 
[When designing models to explain the benefits 
of tax incentives,] it cannot be assumed that 
immobile bases are perfectly inelastic; at some point 
the shifting tax burden will become too onerous 
causing the immobile base to become mobile.  A 
model should not assume that high tax rates do not 
exacerbate diminishing marginal returns to labor.  By 
reducing the return an individual receives for his or 
her labor, the opportunity cost of engaging in 
income-producing activities increases.  This, in turn, 
would cause productivity to stagnate, if not decline, 
leading to a reduction in the tax revenue collected 
from the immobile base.  Absent the existence of 
circumstances in practice that mirror the model’s 
assumptions, the strong conclusion that 
discriminatory taxation is desirable and beneficial 
                                                 
74 Kaye, supra note 26, at 115-16 (citing The National Economic Policy 
Implications of State Tax Incentive Competition:  Hearing on “Cuno and 
Competitiveness:  Where to Draw the Line” Before the Subcomm. on Int’l 
Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Peter 
Fisher) [hereinafter Statement of Fisher]). 
75 Enrich, supra note 70, at 397; Amicus Curiae Brief of Economics and 
Public Policy Professors et al. in Support of Respondents at 21, 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724). 
76 Kaye, supra note 26, at 116.  
77 Id.; see also Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Reply: Consumption 
Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789, 790 
(2007) (noting that the strong conclusions of simplified models are likely to be 
weakened by more complex models). 
78 Kaye, supra note 26, at 116 (citing Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes 
Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 757, 759 (2001)). 
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Further, “once a state lures a targeted business, it must pay for 
public service support for the business in the form of infrastructure and 
transportation costs, while leaving the previous state with redundant 
public service support infrastructure.”
80
  Enrich describes the states as 
being caught in the classic prisoners’ dilemma:  If every state refrains 
from offering location incentives to target businesses, all states could 
keep bigger tax bases to support other substantial governmental 
functions.  However, if some states choose to offer tax incentives, then 
no state can afford the political cost of abstaining, resulting in 




2.  BMW IN SOUTH CAROLINA:  DID WE ESSENTIALLY BUY 
JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED? 
 
While BMW’s positive economic impact on South Carolina is 
apparent, some opponents of incentives packages argue that buying 
jobs can be expensive.
82
  Southern states may be in danger by expecting 
too much from the automobile industry.
83
  South Carolina’s corporate 
giveaways have been described as “promiscuous” and the state’s 
business tax a mere footnote to the state budget.
84
  Will South Carolina 




BMW’s South Carolina plant has escaped 
millions of dollars in taxes and costs that industrial 
companies expect to pay in developed nations. 
 . . . .  
. . .  The company pays $1 a year to lease its 
$36 million piece of land. It pays no land tax to 
                                                 
79 Kaye, supra note 26, at 116. 
80 Kaye, supra note 26, at 116-117. 
81 Enrich, supra note 70, at 396. 
82 Imported car factories: Buying jobs can be expensive, ECONOMIST, Nov. 
29, 2003, 2003 WLNR 6358487. 
83 Id. 
84 Jay Hancock, S.C. Pays Dearly for Added Jobs, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 
1999, available at http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/tax_news/sc-tax-
news.html. 
85 Id. (quoting Darla Moore, founder and chair of the Palmetto Institute, a 
nonprofit organization striving to improve per capita wealth in South Carolina).  
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Spartanburg County. Building and equipment tax on 
the first phase of BMW's plant is 43 percent lower 
than what established businesses have to pay. Tax 
discounts on BMW's second phase are even bigger -- 
62 percent -- even though the expansion couldn't 
have been built anywhere but Greer. 
. . . .   
BMW uses as many services as other 
companies. Its 2,500 employees have just as many 
school-age children as workers at other businesses. 
Its trucks wear down South Carolina's roads just as 
much as other companies' trucks. Thanks to the 
incentives war between the states, however, BMW 
has been able to carve its own special deal, a deal 
shielding it from obligations for other services that 




Other state “[s]ubsidy winners include amusement parks, cable 
makers, data-storage firms, . . . food warehouses, furniture-foam 
makers, printers, metal fabricators, health-product distributors, textile 
companies, telephone-call centers and magazine sellers.”
87
  Many of 
these businesses, as was the case with BMW’s parts suppliers, planned 
on locating in South Carolina regardless of whether BMW chose South 




The revenue lost when states give away incentive packages 
makes it more difficult for those states to finance important functions 
like state education, police and fire departments, transportation 
systems, and utilities programs.  States must continue to increase tax-
incentive offers in order to keep up with each other and to lure 
businesses; but this competition undermines the ability of states to 
finance the investments in education and infrastructure that actually 




                                                 
86 Hancock, supra note 85. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Kaye, supra note 26, at 117; see also Statement of Fisher, supra note 
75. 
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III.  GOVERNMENTAL IMPACT: HOW INCENTIVE PACKAGES AFFECT 
STATE GOVERNMENT 
 
A.  COLLAPSING STATE GOVERNMENT: TREATING THE BOEING 
DEAL AS TOP-SECRET 
 
“South Carolina lawmakers seemed euphoric when they 
unanimously passed legislation in a special session on [October 28, 
2009] to clear the way for the Chicago-based company[, Boeing,] to 
land a final assembly plant in North Charleston, passing out special 
aerospace coins and lapel pins to commemorate the occasion.”
90
  
“Lawmakers and lobbyists around the State House said they had never 
seen leaders of the House and Senate work so cooperatively before.”
91
  
The reason for the Bill’s unanimous approval in the state legislature 
could be due to the legislature’s failure to exercise due diligence and 
object to voting on a bill name without details.  However, the reason 
also could lie with the failure of the leadership in adequately informing 
the House and the Senate of Boeing’s price tag.  Either way, a failed 
legislative process resulted in the Boeing Bill’s passage.
92
 
This failed legislative process is due to what Edward Zelinsky 
calls “an inherent and irremediable information asymmetry in 
negotiations between state and local officials and the corporations and 
developers with which such officials bargain over tax incentives.”
93
  
Corporations know their exact situs preferences, and they “have no 
reason to disclose these to the officials with whom they are bargaining 
for tax benefits.”
94
  In fact, corporations have great incentive to hide 
their preferences and deliver a message through negotiations that if 
local governments do not offer tax incentives, their community will not 
reap the benefits of the corporation building there.
95
  “If community X 
refuses to grant tax incentives to attract or retain a particular firm, 
                                                 
90 Rick Brundrett & Eric K. Ward, Part I: Inside the Boeing Deal, THE 
NERVE, (Jan. 11, 2010), http://scthenerve.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/part-1-
inside-the-boeing-deal/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).  
91 Shain, supra note 17, at 1B.  
92 Eric K. Ward, Part 3: The Truth on Senate Claims About Boeing, THE 
NERVE (Jan. 12, 2010), http://scthenerve.wordpress.com/2010/01/10/part-3-the-
truth-on-senate-claims-about-boeing (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).  
93 Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Incentives for Economic Development: 
Personal (and Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1145, 1148 
(2008).  
94 Id. at 1148-49. 
95 Id. at 1149. 
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  Therefore, community X’s refusal to offer 
incentives would prove very risky for local officials, who are often 
elected for short periods of time, but “[t]he costs of tax incentives often 
extend far into the future.”
97
  Most elected officials and voters are 
concentrated on the present and do not look very far into the future.  
Consequently, elected officials may gain political advantage by voting 
in favor of granting tax incentives that have immediate and apparent 
benefits.  However, the negative consequences of those benefits, “costs 
in the form of reduced tax revenues[,] do not appear until many years 




B.  OPPORTUNITY COST ANALYSIS 
 
Incentives given to multinational corporations drain the general 
income of the pursuing state.  The logical question follows:  could a 
state that gives a corporation such a generous incentive package have 
spent those funds in a more opportunistic way to produce a stronger 
and more sustainable economy?  “The concept of opportunity cost 
examines what is the highest valued alternative that is foregone when 
one activity is chosen over another.”
99
  Although opportunity costs are 
rarely considered when dealing with state competition through 
incentives,
100
 government actions are not a costless activity.
101
 
Revenue lost through incentive packages is revenue that could 
have helped finance the state’s education, transportation, police, fire, 
and utilities programs.  States that continually increase tax incentives 
above those of other states in order to lure businesses undermine “the 
ability of state and local government to finance the investments in 
public education and infrastructure that provide the foundation for 
future economic growth.”
102
   
When faced with a “wrecked budget that threatens [public] 
schools, colleges and law enforcement,” should the legislature have 




99 CALCAGNO & HEFNER, supra note 3, at 143. 
100 Ann Markusen, Reining in the Competition for Capital, 4 J. APPLIED 
RES. ECON. DEV., No. 2: 78 (2007).  
101 Anne Kruger, Government Failures in Development, 4 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES, No. 3: 9-23 (Summer 1990).  
102 Kaye, supra note 26, at 117.  
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borrowed $270 million to build an assembly line?
103
  Keep in mind that 
the total amount borrowed by South Carolina over the next fifteen years 
amounts to about $83,000 for each of the Boeing plant’s 3,800 
employees.
104
  Further, small South Carolina businesses may suffer lost 
goodwill as a result of incentives packages being given to larger out-of-
state corporations. 
However, the 3,800 jobs that Boeing is projected to create will 
not solely employ current South Carolina residents.  Those jobs are 
expected to employ a mix of currently unemployed South Carolina 
residents and residents seeking higher salary jobs.  In addition, highly-
qualified executives and highly-skilled engineers will be brought in 
from out of state for select higher-level positions.  Assuming that at 
least 1,000 of the 3,800 Boeing jobs will be these higher-level jobs, 
South Carolina will automatically attract those people of higher 
educational backgrounds.  South Carolina will collect income taxes 
from those people.  Assuming most of these non-resident employees 
are married and have families, they will bring their spouses with them, 
who will also work in South Carolina, educate their children in South 
Carolina, buy homes and pay property taxes in South Carolina, and 
become consumers in a state whose economy is in desperate need of all 
of the above.  Houses that were empty will be filled, new business will 
be created, and hard-working, driven people will rear and educate their 
families in South Carolina. 
Additionally, South Carolinian companies will be hired to build 
many of the buildings.  By proving to other industries and companies 
the state’s willingness and eagerness to successfully integrate new 
businesses into South Carolina, the state will attract more new 
businesses in the future.  While there are staunch negatives in this 
opportunity-cost analysis, the overall future opportunity benefits 
probably outweigh any costs. 
 
                                                 
103 Jim Davenport, S.C. Lawmakers Approve Boeing Bonds, 
MANUFACTURING.NET (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.manufacturing.net/News-
SC-Lawmakers-Approve-Boeing-Bonds-011210.aspx?menuid=246 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011).  
104 Tim Smith, Boeing Loan to Cost State $83,000 Per Job, GREENVILLE 
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2010, available at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/greenvilleonline/access/1940281321.html?FMT=A
BS&date=Jan+14%2C+2010.  
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IV.  THE SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 2010:  
WHY ITS CHALLENGERS WERE WRONG 
 
“A presumption and hallmark of federalism mandates that states 
have general police powers over their internal affairs.  The creation and 
structuring of economic incentives . . . are, and have historically been, 
within this purview of states’ rights.”
105
  Offering state incentives is an 
exercise of a state’s broad police power.
106
  “States enjoy comparative 
informational advantages over the federal government and are more 
competent at enacting effective economic measures.”
107
  Because states 
across the country have different needs, each state should be capable of 
assessing their own economic needs and structuring a system that 
works best for their citizens. 
The South Carolina Economic Development Competitiveness 
Act of 2010 (“Act”) was proposed with the purposes of promoting 
business expansion using state incentives, phasing out South Carolina’s 
corporate income tax, and improving the reward for employers who 
create new jobs.
108
  An economic development committee, composed 
of six business leaders and assembled by S.C. House Speaker Bobby 
Harrell, drafted the Act.
109
  Their goal was “to pick through the state’s 
existing laws, looking for ways to sweeten the deal for companies as 
they look to emerge from weathering the economic recession.”
110
 
                                                 
105 Jennifer M. Lee, Comment, A Match Made in Heaven or a Pair of 
Star-Crossed Lovers? Assessing Dormant-Foreign-Commerce-Clause 
Limitations on the Wisconsin-China Relationship, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 733, 747 
(2009) (citation omitted).  
106 See id. 
107 Id. at 748.  
108 Katy Stech, State Forming Own Stimulus Package, POST & COURIER 
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/feb/22/state-forming-own-stimulus-
package/; see also South Carolina Economic Development Competitiveness 
Act of 2010, S.C. Act No. 290, available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/4478.htm.  
109 The other committee members included April Allen, O’Neal, Inc.; 
Lewis Gossett, S.C. Manufacturers Alliance; Nick Kremydas, S.C. Association 
of Realtors; Burnie Maybank, Nexsen Pruet; former director of S.C. Dept. of 
Revenue, Otis Rawl, S.C. Chamber of Commerce; and George Wolfe, Nelson 
Mullins—Chairman, Economic Development Practice Group. 
110 Stech, supra note 108. 
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After passing through both the House and the Senate, Governor 
Sanford signed the Act into law on June 23, 2010.
111
  Before passage, a 
few major concerns with the proposed Act existed.  Some were worried 
that the Act could spur business owners to hire employees more quickly 
because they may be eligible for generous tax breaks for each new 
worker.  Also, many feared the Act would come at the expense of some 
state and property tax revenues. 
The main concern with the Act involved the proposed gradual 
elimination of South Carolina’s corporate income tax.  This is “a move 
that would strip hundreds of millions of dollars from already depleted 
state coffers and fail to provide any relief to more than 95 percent of 
the state’s businesses.”
112
  Four other states, Wyoming, South Dakota, 
Washington and Nevada, have already eliminated corporate income 
tax.
113
  Doing so will hopefully catch the attention of companies 
looking to expand operations, but it is open to debate as to whether 
eliminating the tax will greatly affect the state’s revenue.
114
  Most small 
businesses in South Carolina pay no corporate income tax anyhow 
because most are registered as “entities” other than “corporations.”
115
  
In addition, the two main sources of tax revenue for the state are sales 
tax and individual income taxes.
116
  While corporate income tax, a tax 
on a business’s profit, adds to the state’s revenue, it amounts to the 




Proponents of the Act, however, claimed that the Act was just a 
“tweaking” of existing incentives programs, which South Carolina 
needed to better utilize.  Section 11-18-60 of the bill allowed South 
Carolina counties to pool their bond capacities.
118
   
                                                 
111 South Carolina Statehouse Blog, Press Release: Gov. Sanford Signs 
Economic Development Competitiveness Act, available at 
http://sc.statehouseblogs.com/2010/06/23/press-release-gov-sanford-signs-
economic-development-competitiveness-act/. 
112 Katy Stech & Yvonne Wenger, Tax Proposal Supported, Opposed, 







117 Id.  
118 S.C. Act 290, supra note 109. 
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Each county received small increments from the federal stimulus 
bill in 2009, but these amounts are so small that few government 
agencies have been able to spend it.  By pooling the bonds, counties 
working together will raise enough money for public infrastructure 
projects and economic development projects that each county would 
not have been able to accomplish on its own.  In addition, the Act gave 
the State Ports Authority an $8 million pool of tax breaks, which they 
can offer to port users that are boosting their business and encourage 
port development.  “The value of  [the] state’s existing job 
development tax credits, which company executives can use to cut 
down on paying employee withholding income taxes, would be 
doubled, but the length of time employers have to claim them would 
[be] shortened over time, balancing out the expense.”
119
 
While the proposed bill passed with flying colors in the House, 
South Carolina state senators found it more difficult to agree that the 
benefits of the bill outweighed the negatives.
120
  The senators were 
concerned with losing the “5 percent” of revenue that the state usually 
counts on from corporations; roughly $167 million usually enters the 
state general fund each year.
121
  These funds are then “used to run state 
agencies and programs that serve S[outh] C[arolina] residents.”
122
  
Senator Billy O’Dell, chair of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on 
Sales and Income Tax, said his committee ran critical tests.
123
  After the 
measure passed O’Dell’s subcommittee, the bill went “immediately to 
the full Senate Finance Committee for consideration.”
124
  The Senate 
Finance Committee passed the bill with an overwhelming vote of 18-0. 
Many of the Senate’s fears should have been eliminated after the 
Senate Finance Committee’s unanimous vote in favor of the bill and 
because several of the bill’s most worrisome components were 
                                                 
119  See Stech, supra note 108. 
120 See Roddie Burris, End Corporate Income Tax? Senators Weigh Bill, 
STATE (Columbia, SC), Mar. 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.thestate.com/2010/03/30/1222044/end-corportate-income-tax-
senators.html; see also Burnie Maybank & George Wolfe, South Carolina 





121 See Burris, supra note 120. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
278 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
amended before the House passed the bill.
125
  As it stood before the 
Senate, the corporate tax phase-out would not have begun until two 
years from the enactment of the legislation, as many hoped that the 
economy would rebound by then.
126
  Also, the bill contained a tax 
credit for small businesses with five employees or fewer, if they add 
workers.  The bill, which was sponsored by Harrell, had more than one 
hundred House members as co-signers.
127
 
The four states that have already eliminated their corporate 
income tax provided great insight for what may come in South 
Carolina.  Despite that insight, experts warn that these states “have 
found the incentives to be severe under-performers,”
128
 instead of the 
“game-changer in luring industry and creating jobs.”
129
  Michael 
Mazerov, an analyst for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in 
Washington, said that eliminating the tax has “been anything but a 
game-changer.”
130
  Mazerov believes “too much emphasis and hype” 
has been placed on cutting business taxes as a way to increase state 
income.
131
  While a handful of other states have eliminated the 
corporate income tax, they all replaced the tax with some other revenue 
stream or broad-based substitute.
132
  “Nevada relies on its gambling 
appeal to fill [the revenue] void . . . and Wyoming relies on its rich oil 
and gas reserves.”
133
   
 
V.  THE OPPONENTS’ REFUGE IN THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress alone has the 
power to regulate interstate commerce.
134
  When Congress does not 
exercise this power, legal scholars call it a dormant power.  In 
Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme Court held that the “state 
taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or 
spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.”
135
  
Thus, a federal court is not an appropriate forum for a taxpayer to 









133 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
134 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
135 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 332 (2006). 
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challenge a state incentive.  The Cuno decision clarified that having the 
status of a state taxpayer is not enough for standing under the United 
States Constitution.
136
  In order for a citizen to bring a Commerce 
Clause challenge to a state tax incentive program in federal court, the 
taxpayer “must establish that he has sustained a direct injury as a result 
of the challenged tax scheme.”
137
  The injury must not be hypothetical 
or generally common to people.
138
  However, the requirements for a 
taxpayer to sue in state court may not be as stringent.
139
 
States that compete for the tax-incentive-recipient corporations 
may be in a good position to raise a federal court claim.
140
  Enrich 
asserts that these states are in the position to challenge state tax 
incentives as the “most direct losers in the ongoing incentive 
competition.”
141
  Secondly, Enrich argues that “‘states are particularly 
appropriate parties to bring Commerce Clause issues before the courts’ 
because the Commerce Clause’s ‘primary focus concerns the structural 
dangers posed to the federal system by excessive state interference with 
the dynamics of the national economy.’”
142
  Each state has a “peculiarly 
direct and compelling interest in the enforcement of this structural 
safeguard of federalism.”
143
  The states, however, seem to have no 
interest in protecting their citizens and challenging tax incentive 
programs because “more than half the states and several U.S. 
Territories filed an amicus brief together in support of petitioners’ 




The alternative venue for pursuing challenges is in state court.  In 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the United States Supreme Court distinguished 
a state taxpayer’s standing in state court versus federal court.
145
  The 
Court stated that in federal court, “[the Court] ha[s already] likened 
state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus [it has] refused to confer 
standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing of ‘direct injury,’ 
                                                 





141 Enrich, supra note 70, at 418-19.  
142 Kaye, supra note 26, at 132 (quoting Enrich, supra note 70, at 419). 
143 Enrich, supra note 70, at 419. 
144 Id. 
145 ASARCO Inc., v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).  
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  The Court, however, differentiated state 
taxpayers’ standing in state court: 
“[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to 
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not 
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or 
other federal rules of justiciability even when they 
address issues of federal law, as when they are called 
upon to interpret the Constitution . . . .”  Given the 
Kadish decision, it is clear that states are not bound to 
adhere to the “case-or-controversy” doctrine.  Thus, it 
appears that state court, as opposed to federal court, 
will more likely address the merits of a state 
taxpayer’s challenge to a state tax incentive.
 147
 
While the standing rules change from state to state, litigation 
against various state incentive programs is underway.  For example, the 
North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law (NCICL) represented 
several North Carolina taxpayer groups in challenging incentives 
offered to companies that invested in the state.
148
  One case arose when 
North Carolina’s state and local governments planned to provide Dell 
Inc. “with $279 million in various tax incentives and subsidies to build 
a computer manufacturing and distribution facility in the state.”
149
  
Relying on the Commerce Clause and a number of state constitutional 
arguments, the taxpayers sought to challenge the state’s tax incentive 
package.  “The North Carolina Superior Court dismissed the complaint 
due to lack of standing.  The Court of Appeals of North Carolina 




Another North Carolina case, which is ongoing, involves a group 
of taxpayers who are also represented by NCICL.  This group is 
challenging “an economic development incentive granted to a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Google, Inc.”
151
  Included in the $165 million 
package is total relief of “business personal property taxes and an 80% 
                                                 
146 Kadish, 490 U.S. at 613-14. 
147 Kaye, supra note 26, at 132-33 (quoting Kadish, 490 U.S. at 617). 
148 Kaye, supra note 26, at 134. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.; see also Blinson v. North Carolina, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2007).  
151 Kaye, supra note 26, at 135. 
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refund of real property taxes for the next 30 years.”
152
  This group also 




Recently, the NCICL has filed two more lawsuits on behalf of 
concerned taxpayers.  They filed the first case in Wake County 
Superior Court after the county gave Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company and Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. a sixty million 
dollar incentive package.
154
  A second case was filed in Durham 
County Superior Court and challenged the county’s plan to give the 
Nitronex Corporation $100,000 in subsidies if the corporation would 
move to Durham County from another North Carolina county.
155
  
Instead of relying on the Commerce Clause, both of these complaints 
allege violations of the North Carolina constitution.
156
 
Similar to the North Carolina cases, Minnesota taxpayers brought 
suit against the state because of the state’s Job Opportunity Building 
Zone (JOBZ) program.
157
  This program allows local governments in 
the state to grant “a variety of incentives and credits to businesses that 
relocate to, or expand employment or capital investment in designated 
zones.”
158
  The taxpayers’ main argument was that the JOBZ program 
violated the Commerce Clause.  They claimed that this program used 
“unfair inducement to expand in the designated zones in Minnesota 
rather than in some other state.”
159
  Even though taxpayer standing in 
state court is easier to achieve than in federal court, “the Court of 
Appeals of Minnesota dismissed the suit because the lack of an injury-
in-fact deprived the challengers of standing.”
160
  However, a different 
group of Minnesota taxpayers is raising a new challenge to the JOBZ 
program.  This time the challenge may “withstand a motion to dismiss[, 
                                                 
152 Id. (citing NC Institute for Constitutional Law, The Incentive Game: 
North Carolina Local Economic Development Incentives 8 (2007)). 




157 Id.; see also Olson v. Minnesota, 742 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007).  
158 Chris Atkins & Joseph D. Henchman, The Ohio Incentives Decision 
and the Quest for a 21st Century Tax System, 40 ST. TAX NOTES 945, Doc. No. 
2006-11356 (2006) (LEXIS). 
159 Kaye, supra note 26, at 136. 
160 Id.; see also Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 684-85. 
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b]ecause it ‘directly compete[s] with businesses receiving benefits 
under JOBZ’”;
161
 so it claims to have an injury-in-fact.  
Lawsuits against incentives in states other than North Carolina 
and Minnesota will most likely face “a fate similar to the dismissed 
cases in North Carolina and Minnesota[,] . . . where the state trial 
judges ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the tax 




VI.  CONCLUSION:  BENEFITS OF RECRUITING MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE SOUTH 
 
In conclusion, by examining how states in the recent past have 
used incentive packages to entice companies to their respective states, 
the distinct advantages of companies choosing to accept lucrative 
incentive packages become evident.  Building a plant in a relatively 
unknowledgeable and ill-equipped region may have major pay-offs for 
companies in the form of tax incentives.  South Carolina may soon be 
able to offer even greater incentives to build in the state due to the 
aforementioned Act, which eliminates or greatly reduces corporate 
income tax. 
A large company may boost state morale by being a shining 
example of environmental sustainability; may provide the technology 
standards and train employees to form a knowledge-based community; 
and may directly and indirectly create jobs for those in the community 
and the greater region.  However, opposition to state incentive 
packages remains.  Opponents argue that the money that states are 
spending competing with each other to “win” the companies and have 
them build in their respective states could be better spent elsewhere.  
Instead of “buying” these companies, states should put money into their 
public education systems and use that money efficiently to educate 
their citizens and form knowledge-based communities.   
However, it is increasingly important for America to stay 
competitive in attracting and retaining businesses that are competing in 
a global market.  As demonstrated, the states have an important role 
within our federal system in providing attractive business opportunities 
to lure and retain these businesses. In this age of globalization, 
                                                 
161 Kaye, supra note 26, at 136 (quoting Dale Busacker, Appeals Court 
Dismisses Challenge to Economic Development Program, 47 ST. TAX NOTES 
17, Doc. No. 2008-34 (2008) (LEXIS)).   
162 Kaye, supra note 26, at 136. 
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“perhaps the most pragmatic advantage to state participation in foreign 
commerce is the flexibility it allows.”
163
  International trade between 
countries and states has been dramatically increased through economic 
globalization in the past twenty years.  “Interstate competition is a fact 
in our federalist system, and we must not overlook the growth and 
acceptance of state action in trade and investment.  In general, 
‘subnational governments within federal systems worldwide have taken 
an increased interest in the conduct of foreign affairs.’”
164
  The use of 
state tax incentives is steadily growing, and as long as states continue to 
use more credits for job training, employment opportunities, education 
of the community, development of businesses, and other positive uses, 
potential for economic tax incentives is endless.  For states that utilize 
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